Navigating the Political versus Social Realities of “Responsible Internationalization”

The European Commission recently unveiled its guidelines on tackling research and innovation (R&I) foreign interference, a document that (re)defines “responsible internationalization” in higher education. While internationalization was once conceived as a means to address global societal challenges, the Commison’ current definition of “responsibility” now prioritizes national security and economic competitiveness. This shift—along with other countries and regions—marks a significant departure from the rapid growth of international scientific collaboration since the 1990s, which saw cross-border coauthorship rise from less than 2 percent of all Web of Science papers in 1970 to 23.2 percent in 2020.

This view of “responsible internationalization” marks a significant departure from the emphasis on “social responsibility,” as for instance emphasized in the 2015 definition of internationalization, promoting a meaningful contribution to society, and calls by scholars and practitioners, advocating for a more ethical, inclusive, and localized approach.

The political interpretation of “responsible internationalization” has been driven by a complex interplay of factors. Rising geopolitical tensions have created an environment where international collaborations can inadvertently become conduits for political influence or coercion. Concerns over intellectual property theft are not unfounded, with documented cases of economic espionage and unauthorized technology transfer occurring through academic channels. Additionally, there are real risks of ethics dumping, where less stringent ethical standards in some countries could be exploited, and of dual-use research being misappropriated for harmful purposes.

However, geopolitical tensions and security concerns have led to an evolution in the term “responsible.” The key difference is that “responsible” is now framed in political terms, not societal ones, focused on knowledge security rather than exchange and cooperation. As Tommy Shih argues, it now “focuses on the discretionary responsibilities that researchers have when building international relationships,” and is more narrowly aimed at national interests than ever before.

This shift in European Union policy—like shifts in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—marks a significant change in international scientific collaboration with echoes of the Cold War-era but with crucial differences. During the Cold War, scientific collaboration was heavily restricted along ideological lines, with limited exchange between Eastern and Western blocs. Unlike the binary East–West divide of the Cold War, current policies must navigate a multipolar world with complex, intertwined research networks. The challenge lies in implementing this principle effectively, balancing security concerns with the need for open scientific exchange in a way that Cold War-era policies often failed to do.

The Council of the European Union seems aware of the chilling effect that overregulation or excessive intervention could have on science, reflected in its guiding principle for its responsible internationalization policy: “as open as possible, as closed as necessary.” Transferring control over research openness from scientists to institutions and policy makers risks undermining the autonomy of scientists and politicizing research agendas.

Across Europe, academic communities are voicing apprehension about the potential consequences if security considerations take precedence. In Sweden, Agneta Bladh, former chair of the Swedish Research Council, warns that the traditional openness of research and internationalization is under threat. The Guild, a network of European research-intensive universities, echoes these concerns. While acknowledging the need for risk mitigation, they emphasize that such measures should not hinder our collective ability to tackle pressing scientific research that requires international cooperation. Similar concerns related to national security versus international collaboration can also be found elsewhere.

The implications of the political interpretation of “responsible internationalization” are multifaceted. Fields such as climate science, epidemiology, and renewable energy research, while not traditionally high-security areas, may face challenges due to data sensitivity and economic competitiveness concerns. Moreover, these policies risk widening the research gap between high-, mid-, and low-income countries. Finally, this new emphasis on national interests could fragment the research landscape, leading to duplicated efforts and slower overall progress. These implications drive responsible internationalization in the opposite direction as advocated in calls for internationalization for society, and challenge academic freedom and autonomy.

We have to ask ourselves a number of questions. Who defines what is responsible practice, and what is open or closed? What are the implications of policies that emphasize necessary closeness more than possible openness? Should responsible internationalization not be primarily international and social instead of national and political? Is the new approach to responsible internationalization as one protecting national interests, competitiveness, and liberal democratic values not a new form of internationalization as a Western paradigm? Should the guiding principle not be the other way around: as open as necessary, as little as possible closed?